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Abstract
When judging their likelihood of success in competitive tasks, people tend to be overoptimistic for easy tasks and
overpessimistic for hard tasks (the shared circumstance effect; SCE). Previous research has shown that feedback and
experience from repeated-play competitions has a limited impact on SCEs. However, in this paper, we suggest that
competitive situations, in which the shared difficulty or easiness of the task is more transparent, will be more amenable
to debiasing via repeated play. Pairs of participants competed in, made predictions about, and received feedback on,
multiple rounds of a throwing task involving both easy- and hard-to-aim objects. Participants initially showed robust
SCEs, but they also showed a significant reduction in bias after only one round of feedback. These and other results
support a more positive view (than suggested from past research) on the potential for SCEs to be debiased through
outcome feedback.
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1 Introduction
Competition abounds in everyday life, where we con-
tend with others for top grades, jobs, trophies, and mates.
When resources are at a premium, it is optimal to enter
into competitive environments in which we are certain to
fare well and to avoid those in which we are doomed to
fail. However, when people evaluate their likelihood of
success in competitions, they are subject to a robust bias:
a competitor should consider the strengths and weak-
nesses of the self and the other competitor(s) (Burson,
Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Moore & Kim, 2003; Wind-
schitl, Rose, Stalkfleet, & Smith, 2008), but people of-
ten give too much weight to evidence related to their
own strengths and weaknesses and too little weight to
such evidence about the competitor (Pahl, 2012; Rose,
Jasper, & Corser, 2012; Rose & Windschitl, 2008; Wind-
schitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003; Windschitl et al., 2008).
This egocentrism results in overoptimism when the cir-
cumstances of the competition are favorable, such as
when competitors in a trivia game learn that the ques-
tions will be from an easy category—even though they’ll
be easy for everyone (Moore & Kim, 2003; Windschitl
et al., 2003). Egocentrism also results in overpessimism
when the circumstances are unfavorable (e.g., a difficult
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trivia category). This phenomenon of being more opti-
mistic when shared competitive circumstances are favor-
able than when they are not has been dubbed the shared-
circumstance effect (SCE; Windschitl et al., 2003), and it
has been replicated across a variety of settings (e.g., gen-
eral knowledge tasks, card games, athletic competitions).
In most previous studies on the SCE, participants were
presented with novel, non-repeated competitive situa-
tions. These situations did not allow people to learn from
past experiences or from feedback within the immedi-
ate competitive context. However, in everyday contexts
there are often opportunities to learn how a shared cir-
cumstance tends to affect the self, others, and outcomes.
For example, when a tennis tournament is played during
a string of windy days, players can have several opportu-
nities to observe how the weather affects themselves and
their competitors.
To examine whether egocentrism and SCEs persist in
repeated-play contexts, Rose and Windschitl (2008) had
pairs of participants compete against each other in multi-
ple rounds of a trivia contest that involved easy and hard
categories. In each round, participants estimated their
likelihood of beating their competitor, answered trivia
questions, and received feedback about who won. In ini-
tial rounds, there were robust SCEs; participants were
much more optimistic about winning easy categories than
hard ones. If they encountered the same hard and easy
categories across rounds, the participants learned from
feedback. That is, the SCE shrank—but slowly—across
six rounds with the same categories. The SCE was never
eliminated, even after six rounds. Also, for a seventh
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round, participants were told there would be new cate-
gories. The SCE for that round dramatically and fully re-
bounded; it was every bit as large as observed for Round
1. These results provide a bleak view of how well peo-
ple can learn from feedback and avoid SCEs. More-
over, results from a study by Moore and Cain (2006),
which also used repeated plays with feedback, suggest an
even bleaker view. Those researchers also used easy and
difficult quizzes as shared-circumstance manipulations,
but found virtually no reduction in SCEs after numerous
rounds with feedback. (For related findings, see Study 3
of Burson & Klayman, 2005.)
Are people’s abilities to learn to avoid SCEs—based
on feedback—really as bleak as this prior research might
suggest? We argue that some shared circumstances are
more transparently shared than others, and this may af-
fect how readily people learn to avoid the bias that creates
SCEs—and how easily they can transfer this learning to
a slightly new set of shared circumstances. By transpar-
ently shared, we are referring to how obvious it is that a
circumstance that is helpful or hindering to the self will
affect others in largely the same way.
In the present study, we examined the influence of
repeated feedback on SCEs. However, unlike past re-
search, we used a competition in which the difficulty of
the shared circumstance (relative to competitions, for ex-
ample, involving easy and hard trivia categories) is more
transparently shared. In a multi-round paradigm, partic-
ipants competed in object-tossing competitions. In each
round, two competitors each had 8 throws per object—
attempting to land the object inside a target area. There
was always one easy-to-aim object (e.g., a beanbag) and
one hard-to-aim object (e.g., a paper plate), which con-
stituted our shared-circumstance manipulation. Full feed-
back was given during and after each round, and predic-
tions were solicited before each round and also before a
final round with novel objects.
We suspected that a tossing competition, rather than a
trivia competition, would produce less bleak results about
the debiasing of SCEs through repeated play. In the case
of trivia, watching one’s competitor fail to answer trivia
questions doesn’t give any insight about why the category
is difficult for that person. Also, knowing that one’s com-
petitor struggled on a difficult category does not provide
obvious information about why he or she might strug-
gle on another difficult category. However, in the case
of throwing, watching a competitor fail when tossing
an object probably illuminates the relevance of specific
shared, situational circumstances (i.e., the properties of
the specific objects) as well as a more general awareness
of the relevance that object properties have on throwing
success—for anyone. For example, seeing a paper plate
fly unpredictably will likely give an observer a clear im-
pression that the object will fly unpredictably regardless
of who is throwing it. For participants, this enhances the
appreciation that one’s struggles are not primarily due to
personal characteristics but to properties of the tossed ob-
jects; this would then be useful in mitigating egocentrism
and SCEs, even when new objects are introduced.
Consequently, we expected that, even though partic-
ipants might reveal a robust SCE at Round 1 (prior to
any feedback or observations regarding their competitor),
they would show a pronounced learning effect after the
feedback and observations of Round 1. That is, they
would show significantly reduced SCEs starting imme-
diately after Round 1. We also expected that this learn-
ing would be generally transferable. That is, unlike prior
work (Rose & Windschitl, 2008), we expected that, when
participants learned that they were throwing novel objects
in the final round, they would not revert to the same de-
gree of SCEs as they had exhibited in the first round.
2 Method
2.1 Participants and design
Fifty undergraduates participated to fulfill a research-
exposure requirement (one pair was removed due to hav-
ing incomplete data). We used a 2 X 6 design, where
object difficulty (easy or hard) and round (1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
or 6) were both manipulated within participants. We also
manipulated which of three object sets were used. These
object sets are described below, but preliminary analyses
revealed no interactions with this factor, so it will not be
described in the results below. Other counterbalancing
factors are described below. Sample size was predeter-
mined and was intended to provide adequate power in
light of our prior research using a similar design (Rose
& Windschitl, 2008).
2.2 Information about the objects and com-
petition
The competition involved tossing objects to a 4 X 4 ft
(1.21 X 1.21 m) bull’s-eye target on the floor from about
10 ft (3 m) away—earning 0-3 points depending upon
landing location. Both competitors threw the same two
objects (many times). Based on pilot testing, we knew
that one of the objects was generally easy to accurately
throw and the other was generally hard—this constituted
our within-participant manipulation of object difficulty.
Depending on the session, the easy and hard objects were
a small beanbag and paper plate (Set 1), a small (play-
ing card) box and round plastic container (Set 2), or a
flattened toilet paper roll and an irregularly-shaped eraser
(Set 3), respectively.
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2.3 Procedure and measures
Participants entered sessions in pairs and were introduced
to each other and to the basics of the competition (in-
cluding tie-breaker procedures). Prior to the competition,
each participant was given practice throws in private (8
throws per object), while the co-participant was in an
adjoining room. The experimenter told each participant
what his/her score would have been if scored.
Prior to Round 1, each participant completed a form
asking him/her to estimate the likelihood that he/she
would score more points in the upcoming round than their
co-participant for each object, from 0% (no chance) to
100% (certainty). Specifically, participants were asked:
“For each item, please estimate the likelihood that you
will be able to beat your competitor in throwing the item
accurately at the target. That is, what is the likelihood that
you will have more points than will your co-participant?
You can use any number between 0% and 100%. 0%
would mean you think there is no chance you will beat
your competitor. 100% would mean you are absolutely
certain you will beat your competitor.” Participants also
estimated their own and their co-participant’s number of
points for each object out of 24 (8 throws for up to 3
points each). Specifically, participants were asked “For
each item, please estimate the number of points you will
have across 8 throws” and “For each item, please estimate
the number of points your co-participant will have across
8 throws.”
For Round 1, one participant took all 8 throws (in pub-
lic) for the first object, then all 8 throws for the second
object. The second participant then did the same. The
order in which the easy vs. hard objects were thrown was
varied between-participants. Also, the order in which the
two participants threw alternated across rounds. At the
end of Round 1, the experimenter tallied the number of
points and wrote the scores on a white-board in view of
the participants. After this feedback, participants went on
to the next round and continued through 6 total rounds.
Each round involved another set of likelihood and score
estimates, throws using the same 2 objects, and full feed-
back.
After Round 6, participants were shown 4 novel ob-
jects (2 easy, 2 hard) that would ostensibly be thrown for
a 7th round. Participants were given two practice throws
each for these novel objects (in public) before making
likelihood and score estimates. At this point, and before
actually having to make these throws, participants were
debriefed and dismissed.
Table 1: Point totals as a function of object difficulty and
round.
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6
Easy object
M 15.78 15.76 16.14 15.72 16.32 16.60
SD 3.80 3.97 4.17 4.37 3.53 3.18
Hard object
M 7.24 7.90 8.06 7.88 7.96 7.70
SD 4.71 4.88 4.80 4.46 4.69 4.76
Note. The point totals for each round are out
of a maximum of 24 for each object.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Difficulty manipulation check
Analyses of actual scores verified that the objects we
identified as easy from pilot testing were, in fact, eas-
ier. That is, they resulted in higher scores (M = 16.05;
SD = 3.18) than did the hard objects (M = 7.79; SD =
3.89), F(1, 49) = 537.33, p < .01. This effect did not dif-
fer across round (F = 0.57, p = .72), and there was no
main effect for round (F = 1.02, p =.40). (See Table 1.)
3.2 Likelihood estimates
Table 2 displays means and standard deviations for
participants’ likelihood estimates (and other estimates)
across rounds. An important initial question is whether
there was any SCE at Round 1. Indeed, there was—
likelihood estimates were higher for easy objects than
hard objects—by 17.9%, t(49) = 5.35, p < .01, d = .76.
Because each competition involved 2 competitors, ex-
actly one of which would win, the average of the like-
lihood estimates should be at 50% regardless of cate-
gory difficulty. However, participants were significantly
overoptimistic (compared to 50%) about a victory for
easy objects (M = 62.3), t(49) = 5.09, p < .01, d = .72,
and overpessimistic for hard objects (M = 44.4), t(49) =
−1.99, p = .05, d = .28. Critically, the size of the SCE
dipped significantly by Round 2, where it was 10.9%.
That is, the interaction of a Difficulty (Easy or Hard) X
Round (1 or 2) ANOVA was significant, F(1,49) = 4.34, p
< .05, ηp2 = .08. This result is different from those of sim-
ilar comparisons in Rose and Windschitl (2008), where
Round 1 feedback did not have a significant impact on
SCEs seen in Round 2 predictions.
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Table 2: Mean likelihood and absolute score estimates by
difficulty and round.
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6 Post-
Comp
Likelihood estimates
Easy
M 62.3 60.2 60.5 57.5 59.5 59.7 59.1
SD 17.1 21.3 22.1 26.1 26.1 26.4 17.1
Hard
M 44.4 49.3 50.5 50.5 51.8 52.7 50.7
SD 19.9 17.2 21.9 21.3 22.2 22.4 18.9
SCE
M 17.9 10.9 10.0 7.02 7.66 6.98 8.37
SD 23.7 24.9 25.1 22.4 32.4 27.5 13.4
Score estimates
Easy-self
M 15.1 15.9 15.8 16.2 16.3 16.7 13.3
SD 3.84 4.41 4.56 3.98 4.21 4.03 4.66
Easy-other
M 14.6 15.8 15.8 16.5 15.9 16.0 12.2
SD 3.94 4.70 5.13 4.55 4.69 4.42 4.63
Hard-self
M 8.78 9.08 8.82 9.02 8.94 8.92 9.36
SD 4.32 4.68 4.66 4.37 4.29 4.59 4.93
Hard-other
M 9.66 9.34 9.14 9.10 8.66 8.34 8.93
SD 4.92 5.46 5.23 4.94 4.36 4.44 4.68
Note. The SCE index was calculated by subtracting
likelihood estimates made for hard objects in a given
round from likelihood estimates made for easy ob-
jects in the same round. Values in the “Post-comp”
column were mean likelihood and score estimates
made for a novel set of easy and hard objects after
all 6 rounds of competition had finished.
For testing patterns incorporating data from all rounds,
we conducted a Difficulty (Easy or Hard) X Round (1, 2,
3, 4, 5, or 6) ANOVA. A main effect of difficulty reveals
a robust overall SCE, where participants provided higher
likelihood estimates for easy objects (M = 59.95; SD =
20.08) than hard objects (M = 49.87: SD = 15.24), F(1,
49) = 13.61, p < .01, ηp2 = .22. The round main effect
was not significant, F(5, 245) = 0.50, p > .70, ηp2 = .01.
Most importantly, the Difficulty X Round interaction was
Figure 1: Mean likelihood estimates as a function of dif-
ficulty and round.
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significant, F(5, 245) = 2.32, p < .05, ηp2 = .05, indicat-
ing that the magnitude of the SCE shifted across rounds.
Figure 1 visually represents the nature of this shift, with
the SCE shrinking across rounds. Paired t-tests between
likelihood estimates for easy vs. hard objects reveal sig-
nificant SCEs in Rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4 (all ts > 2.21, ps <
.05), but non-significant SCEs in Rounds 5 and 6 (all ts <
1.8, ps > .05). We submitted the SCE values to a regres-
sion analysis with round as a predictor. This linear trend
analysis confirmed that the SCE significantly decreased
across rounds, β = −.86, t(5) = -3.43, p < .03.1
3.3 Accounting for changes in SCEs
What accounts for SCEs and changes in SCEs across
rounds? There are two main possibilities to explore—a
differential regression account and an egocentric weight-
ing account. The differential regression account would
assume that the SCE and changes in it are a direct re-
1We also examined the main and interactive impact of our counter-
balancing factors (throwing order and object order) on our main results
involving likelihood estimates. Some of the interactions were signifi-
cant, but none seemed meaningfully interpretable expect one—a Round
X Difficulty X Throwing Order interaction (F = 3.70, p < .05). The in-
teraction pattern revealed that participants showed a greater reduction in
SCEs across rounds in which their co-participant’s performance came
last on the preceding round (recall that throwing order alternated across
rounds). This is not surprising given that recently watching the other
person’s throws would tend to discourage a participant from being ego-
centric (i.e., from neglecting performance on those throws) and would
consequently reduce SCEs.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 6, November 2012 Egocentrism and optimism in repeated competitions 765
Table 3: Results for regression analyses with likelihood
estimates as the criterion and score estimates as predic-
tors.
β (Self) β (Competitor) Differential r
Round 1 .85** −.35** .50 .76
Round 2 .90** −.51** .39 .74
Round 3 .80** −.53** .27 .57
Round 4 .91** −.69** .22 .70
Round 5 .82** −.68** .14 .73
Round 6 1.05** −.84** .21 .82
Post-Comp .86** −.45** .41 .68
Note. Regression analyses were conducted between-
participants with self and competitor score estimates as
simultaneous predictors of likelihood estimates (*p<.05;
**p<.01). The differential column conceptually reflects
the extent to which the self and competitor score esti-
mates have equivalent weight in predicting likelihood es-
timates. For example, a differential of “0” would reflect
that the betas for self and competitor score estimates
were equal but in opposite directions (+/−). The val-
ues in the r column reflect the mean correlation between
self- and competitor- score estimates.
sult of people’s score expectations for the self and their
competitor (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Moore, 2007;
Moore & Small, 2007). Namely, the account suggests
that people initially exhibit a SCE because they expect to
score low on the hard objects and score higher on the easy
objects. However, their expectations about the scores of
the competitor are relatively regressive—that is, closer to
a mid-level than are their expectations about scores for
the self. This regressiveness can be considered sensible
because people know less about the competitor than the
self (Moore & Small, 2007; Windschitl et al., 2003). If
this regressiveness lessens across rounds (as participants
learn more about their competitor’s performances with
hard and easy objects), this would result in a decreased
SCE across rounds (i.e., increased optimism about win-
ning for hard objects and decreased optimism for easy
objects).
The egocentric weighting account assumes that, irre-
spective of any differential regression effects, people’s at-
tention can be egocentrically biased (Chambers & Wind-
schitl, 2004; Rose & Windschitl, 2008; Windschitl et
al., 2008). Even when there is relatively little differ-
ence in their score expectations of how the self and their
competitor will do on a hard object, their likelihood es-
timates about winning are disproportionately influenced
by thoughts about how hard it will be for them to aim
the objects, not how hard it will be for their competitor
(for additional detail, see Windschitl et al., 2008). Across
rounds, the feedback might reduce this tendency because
people will be exposed to the successes and failures of
the competitor. It is important to note that the differential-
regression and egocentric-weighting accounts are not mu-
tually exclusive.
To check on support for a differential regression ac-
count, we created self-other (S-O) difference scores (i.e.,
a participant’s predicted score for the self minus his/her
prediction for the competitor). We then submitted those
scores to many of the same analyses (e.g., difficulty X
round ANOVAs) conducted for the likelihood estimates.
If differential regressiveness provides a fully adequate ac-
count for SCEs and changes in SCEs, then the pattern of
results in these new analyses should match those found
for likelihood estimates. Consistent with this account,
S-O difference scores were higher in Round 1 for easy
objects (M = .42; SD = 3.65) than for hard objects (M =
−.88; SD = 3.41), t(49) = 2.10, p < .04. However, there
was not a significant Difficulty (Easy or Hard) X Round
(1 or 2) interaction like there was for likelihood estimates,
F(1, 49) = 1.46, p = .23. There was also not a significant
main effect of difficulty (F = .67, p =.42), round (F =
.91, p = .48) nor an interaction (F = 1.19, p = .32) in
the Difficulty (Easy or Hard) X Round (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or
6) ANOVA that included all six rounds. For all of these
analyses, the patterns of data were in the right direction,
but the strength of these patterns is not nearly enough for
us to conclude that differential regression alone is ade-
quate for explaining the patterns of SCEs.
We suspect that egocentric weighting (and the reduc-
tion of it) played an important role in the SCE and its
reduction. To test for this, we regressed likelihood es-
timates onto self score estimates, competitor score esti-
mates, and round (after centering; see also Chambers,
Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Rose & Windschitl, 2008).
The first step included the main effects and the second
step included all 2-way and 3-way interactions.
As expected, higher self score estimates predicted
higher likelihood estimates, β = .86, t = 18.38, p < .01.
Different from prior research, lower competitor score es-
timates also predicted higher likelihood estimates, β =
−.59 t = −12.57, p < .01. The main effect of round
was not significant, β = −.01, t = −.23, p > .10. Crit-
ically, the interactions model indicated a significant Self
X Competitor X Round interaction, β = .14, t = 3.32, p
< .01. To interpret this 3-way interaction, we regressed
likelihood estimates onto self and competitor score esti-
mates separately for each round. As can be seen in Table
3, egocentric weighting was relatively strong in Round 1,
where self estimates were strong predictors of likelihood
estimates (mean β = .85, t = 7.05, p < .01) and competi-
tor estimates appeared to be somewhat weaker predictors,
although still significant (mean β = −.35, t = −2.87, p
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< .01). However, egocentric weighting appeared weaker
by Round 6, where both self estimates (mean β = 1.05,
t = 7.43, p < .01) and competitor estimates were rela-
tively strong predictors (mean β = −.84, t = −5.93, p
< .01).2 Critically, competitor betas tended to become
more strongly negative across rounds, based on a regres-
sion treating round as the unit of analysis, β =−.97, t(5) =
−8.07, p < .01. Contrariwise, self betas tended to remain
consistent across rounds, based on a regression treating
round as the unit of analysis, β = .52, t(5) = 1.20, p = .30.
Finally, for another way of examining changes in ego-
centric weighting across rounds, we created a difference
score between beta weights to conceptually reflect the ex-
tent to which the self and competitor score estimates have
equivalent statistical weight in predicting likelihood esti-
mates. For example, a differential of “0” would reflect
that the betas for self and competitor score estimates were
equal but in opposite directions (+/−). This analysis
showed more equivalent weighting of self and competitor
across rounds, based on a regression treating round as the
unit of analysis, β = −.90, t(5) = −4.26, p < .02. Taken
together, these analyses suggest that egocentric weighting
was strong in early rounds and weaker in later rounds—
providing an explanation for the reduction in SCEs.3
3.4 Post-competition estimates
After Round 6, participants made likelihood estimates
about an additional round (Round 7) that was said to in-
volve 4 novel objects (2 easy, 2 hard). Although partici-
2Although one of these coefficients exceeds 1.0, these are, in fact,
standardized (as opposed to unstandardized) regression coefficients.
Contrary to a widespread assumption, there are occasions in which stan-
dardized regression coefficients greater than 1.0 can legitimately occur
(Deegan, 1978).
3The usefulness of comparing regression weights for self and other
estimates might be questioned if people’s estimates for others were
highly regressive and showed little variability. However, as discussed,
differential regressiveness was relatively small and did not change as a
function of round or difficulty. Regression analyses also standardize all
predictors, thus equalizing variances and eliminating the attribution that
one predictor is more influential purely because it has greater variance.
Moreover, our main focus is primarily on how the weights for self and
other estimates (and differences between those weights) changed over
rounds.
We also conducted a different type of analysis examining egocentric
weighting and differential regressiveness. Specifically, we conducted
a regression analysis in which we regressed likelihood estimates onto
S-O difference scores in Step 1, with self scores being entered in Step
2. If self scores are significant predictors above and beyond S-O scores,
then this is evidence for egocentric weighting. First, the S-O scores pre-
dicted likelihood estimates overall, β = .53, t = 15.43, p < .01, where
participants who felt they would outscore their competitor had higher
likelihood estimates. Importantly, self scores accounted for unique vari-
ance in likelihood estimates beyond S-O scores, β = .30, t = 8.56, p <
.01. Importantly, if the contribution of self scores reduces across rounds,
this would indicate a reduction in egocentric weighting. Indeed, a lin-
ear trend analysis confirmed that the R2∆ contribution of self scores
significantly dropped across rounds, β = −.92, t(5) = −4.54, p < .05.
pants were more optimistic about winning easy categories
(M = 59.10, SD = 17.06) than hard ones (M = 50.73, SD
= 18.10), t(49) = 4.41, p < .01, d = .63, the overall SCE
did not rebound to the robust levels of Round 1 for these
novel objects (See Table 2 and Figure 1). More specif-
ically, the magnitude of the SCE for these novel objects
(M = 8.37; SD = 13.39) was statistically similar to the
magnitude observed in Round 6 of the main competition
(M = 6.98; SD = 27.5), t(49) = −.32, p = .75, d = .05,
but was significantly lower than the SCE demonstrated
in Round 1 of the main competition (M = 17.95; SD =
23.73), t(49) = 2.77, p < .01, d = .41. Moreover, a regres-
sion analysis relating participants’ self- and competitor-
score estimates (predictor variables) to their likelihood
estimates (criterion variable) showed a moderate degree
of differential weighting, where self scores (β = .86, t
= 11.39, p < .01) and competitor scores (β = −.45, t =
−6.01, p < .01) both predicted likelihood estimates (see
Table 3).
4 Conclusions
Previous work investigating the impact of experience and
feedback on egocentrism and SCEs in repeated-play com-
petitions has revealed no changes at all (Study 3 of Bur-
son & Klayman, 2005; Study 1 of Moore & Cain, 2007;
Studies 1-2 of Rose & Windschitl, 2008) or changes that
are limited to a restrictive set of conditions (Studies 3-4
of Rose & Windschitl, 2008). In the present experiment,
participants showed an immediate reduction in the SCE
after only 1 round of feedback. When presented with 4
novel objects, they still exhibited a SCE, but at a level
that was much less than they had for the initial round.
While confirming a degree of durability of SCEs, the re-
sults present a more optimistic view than past research of
being able to successfully reduce the bias. Additional re-
sults from this work suggest that the reduction in SCEs
is likely due to a reduction in both differential regression
and egocentric weighting.
Repeated or extended play situations involving shared
circumstances are quite common in everyday life. For
example, businesses compete across months and years,
politicians spar in multiple debates, and athletes compete
in tournaments. For these competitors, using feedback
to go beyond an egocentric assumption about shared cir-
cumstances might be easier to do in some contexts than in
others. We believe that in the present study, the salience
of the visual properties of the throwing objects (and the
effects of those properties) helped people to recognize,
from early performance feedback, that both they and their
competitor were being similarly influenced by the prop-
erties of the objects. Consequently, we suggest that in
everyday competitions, when a shared circumstance is
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salient and performance is being obviously influenced
by those circumstances, people may be able to use per-
formance and outcome feedback to avoid being wildly
under optimistic (in the case of unfavorable shared cir-
cumstances) or overoptimistic (in the favorable circum-
stances). For example, when a tennis player, playing in
windy conditions, can see instances of the wind affecting
shots on both sides of the court, he or she might not be
unduly pessimistic about how the next set or match will
go under the same weather conditions.
References
Burson, K. A., & Klayman, J. (2005). Judgments of
performance: The relative, the absolute, and the in
between. Ross School of Business Paper No. 1015.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=894129.
Burson, K. A., Larrick, R.P., & Klayman, J. (2006).
Skilled or unskilled, but still unaware of it: How per-
ceptions of difficulty drive miscalibrations in relative
comparisons. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 90, 60–77.
Chambers, J. R., & Windschitl, P. D. (2004). Biases in so-
cial comparative judgments: The role of nonmotivated
factors in above-average and comparative-optimism ef-
fects. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 813–838.
Chambers, J., Windschitl, P. D., & Suls, J. (2003). Ego-
centrism, event frequency, and comparative optimism:
When what happens frequently is “more likely to hap-
pen to me”. Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
letin, 29, 1343–1356.
Deegan, J. (1978). On the occurrence of standardized re-
gression coefficients greater than one. Educational and
Psychological Measurement, 38, 873–888.
Moore, D. A. (2007). When good=better than average.
Judgment and Decision Making, 2, 277–291.
Moore, D. A., & Cain, D. M. (2007). Overconfidence
and underconfidence: When and why people under-
estimate (and overestimate) the competition. Organi-
zational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 103,
197–213.
Moore, D. A., & Kim, T. G. (2003). Myopic social pre-
diction and the solo comparison effect. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 85, 1121–1135.
Moore, D. A., & Small, D. A. (2007). Error and bias in
comparative social judgment: On being both better and
worse than we think we are. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 92, 972–989.
Pahl, S. (2012). Would I bet on beating you? Increasing
other-focus helps overcome egocentrism. Experimen-
tal Psychology, 59, 74–81.
Rose, J. P., Jasper, J. D., & Corser, R. (2012). Interhemi-
spheric interaction and egocentrism: The role of hand-
edness in social comparative judgement. British Jour-
nal of Social Psychology, 51, 111–129.
Rose, J. P. & Windschitl, P. D. (2008). How egocen-
trism and optimism change inresponse to feedback in
repeated competitions. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 105, 201–220.
Windschitl, P. D., Kruger, J., & Simms, E. N. (2003). The
influence of egocentrism and focalism on people’s op-
timism in competitions: When what affects us equally
affects me more. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 85, 389–408.
Windschitl, P. D., Rose, J. P., Stalkfleet, M., & Smith, A.
R. (2008). Are people excessive or judicious in their
egocentrism? A modeling approach to understanding
bias and accuracy in people’s optimism. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 253–273.
